About

My name is Tymur Suslov. I work at the intersection of psychology, behavioural security, criminology and profiling, helping organisations understand how behaviour, power and pressure create security risk.

My work is grounded in formal training in international security, risk management, criminology and criminal psychology, and in applied research rather than behavioural slogans.

I am the founder of Gamayun (Gamayun Outsourcing Ltd, UK) and the architect of the Applied Behavioural Profiling Model (ABPM™) – a framework for analysing how different people are likely to behave under specific organisational pressures and constraints.

What I Do

My work focuses on:

Behavioural security consulting
Analysing how roles, decision paths, incentives and culture create predictable patterns of behaviour around critical assets and processes.
Insider risk and deviance
Looking beyond “bad apples” and “human error” to understand how discontent, blocked status, conflicting loyalties and pressure turn into leaks, obstruction or sabotage.
Training and briefings
Giving security, risk and intelligence teams a structured behavioural lens to support governance and investigative decisions, not general awareness.

Where appropriate and ethically justified, I use ABPM™ as one analytical lens for high-risk roles. It is never used as an automated scoring tool or “instant reading” method.

Background & Qualifications

Postgraduate Diploma in International Security and Risk Management (University of South Wales)
Postgraduate Diploma in Criminology and Criminal Psychology (University of Essex)
Author of “Rethinking Security: The Human Side of Risk Management” (Palgrave Macmillan). https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-92068-4
Ongoing research and applied work on behavioural security, risk architecture and profiling, aimed at both practitioners and academic audiences.

How I Work

Across consulting and training, a few principles stay constant:

Behaviour is analysed in context – roles, constraints, pressure and power structures, not just individual choices.
Architecture before blame – I am interested first in how the system makes certain behaviour likely, not just in who made the last mistake.
Clear boundaries – no covert social scoring, no “black box” labels, no profiling used as a shortcut to remove inconvenient people.
Actionable outcomes – the output is always options: where to adjust roles, governance, controls or communication so risk is reduced in practice.